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There is ample recognition of the risk inherent in our very existence and modes
of social organization, with a reasonable expectation that implementing risk
governance will result in enhanced resilience as a society. Despite this, risk
governance is not a mainstream approach in the infrastructure sector, regardless
of the increasing number of peer-reviewed published conceptualizations, mature
procedures to support its application, or public calls to cope with systemic risks
in our modern societies. This paper aims to offer a different view on the issue of
risk governance, with focus in the analysis of the root causes of its relatively
low degree of implementation in the infrastructure sector. We later analyze the
impact of such essential causes, which we have grouped and labeled as the
ontology, the concerns, the anathemas, and the forgotten, in the specific field of
large dams. Finally, we describe the journey toward risk governance in the
specific field of large dams, thus supporting the ultimate objective of this paper
to facilitate an evidence-based approach to successful risk governance implemen-
tation within and outside the dam sector.
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1. Infrastructure risk governance status and needs
Johnston and Hansen (2011) define governance as ‘the collection of technologies,
people, policies, practices, resources, social norms, and information that interact to
support governing activities’ and emphasize that the main challenge consists in how
to design incentives and rules to address the enthusiasm and capabilities of those gov-
erned. For them, governance is broader than government and provides a second defi-
nition of governance in the same work as ‘the interaction of processes, information,
rules, structures and norms that guide behavior toward stated objectives that impact
collection of people.’ Consequently, they acknowledge as some of the main attributes
of governance the scarcity of resources, the coordination of diverse participants and
stakeholders, the processes of decision-making, and the resolution of conflicts.
Wilke (2007) sustained that the meaningful question is not whether there should
be less or more government, escaping from the misleading discussion about big gov-
ernment versus small government, but rather to focus on how to make different
forms of government and governance more intelligent. In this context, he defines
*Corresponding author. Email: iescuder@hma.upv.es
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDeriva-
tives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any
way.
Journal of Risk Research, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2016.1215345
‘smart governance’ as ‘an abbreviation or ensemble of principles, factors, and
capacities that constitute a form of governance able to cope with the conditions and
exigencies of the knowledge society.’ These exigencies of smart governance would
be, in his view, linked to the issues of complexity, uncertainty, competence, and resi-
lience. Wilke (2007) also affirms that the creation of new knowledge becomes para-
mount with the ascendance of innovation into a pole position in the global race for
competitiveness, making it clear that, even when new knowledge exists, it has to
fight for acceptance against resistance and a host of difficulties. As an overarching
attribute, smarter forms of governance would be those better equipped to adopt and
encourage innovation than others.
Risks have become a clear and serious topic of governance theory and practice.
Aven and Renn (2010b), among others, have identified some of the characteristics
of risk in the modern world and highlighted the fact that, while the technological
development of the last decades has led to a reduction of individual risks, the vul-
nerability of many societies or groups in society has increased. In this context, they
use the term ‘emerging systemic risks’ as risks ‘that affect the systems on which the
society depends: health, transport, environment, telecommunications, etc.’ In fact,
the issue of systemic risks and the required principles of governance to address them
had been the object of a European Commission White Paper (2001), namely:
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, coherence, proportionality, and
subsidiarity.
In a more comprehensive definition, according to the International Risk
Governance Council (2005) ‘risk governance includes the totality of actors, rules,
conventions, processes, and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk informa-
tion is collected, analyzed and communicated and management decisions are taken.’
Later, Renn (2008) summarized the concept of risk governance as the ‘translation of
the substance and core principles of governance to the context of risk and
risk-related decision-making,’ a concept that has typically been decomposed into
risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication. It is also worth mention-
ing the contribution of recent standards and frameworks, such as the ISO
31000:2009 (ISO 2009), standard on risk management to provide the conceptual
basis to identify, assess, and manage risks – all activities in the core of risk
governance.
Having defined governance, smart governance, systemic risks, and risk gover-
nance in a way that logically structures how these concepts relate to each other, we
found that there is a lack of standards and procedures to analyze the effectiveness of
risk governance. The Inter-American Bank of Development (BID 2014) has very
recently published an index on governance and public polices as applied to disaster
risk management in which they illustrate through case histories the scarcity of smart
governance implementation. This certainly applies to key sectors linked to systemic
risks such as large civil infrastructures.
In the words of van Asselt and Renn (2011), ‘paradigms and reforms do not shift
in the abstract, but shift in practice,’ or quoting Boholm, Corvellec, and Karlsson
(2012) ‘risk governance is not a framework on which you built; it is something you
learn how to do.’ Consequently, bridging theory and practice remains a scientific
and practical challenge for most.
There is indeed extensive work and a significant number of publications on the
issue of risk and risk management, most of them focused on Enterprise Risk
Management (Zhao, Hwang, and Low 2015), dealing with systemic risks, mainly
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from the financial point of view at very different scales for a broad variety of
sectors. However, even among those corporations that have implemented different
types of risk governance, as reported by Marks (2014), very few companies see their
programs supporting the development and execution of strategy, and a significant
percentage consider them inadequate.
However, systemic risks in our modern societies are not only driven by purely
financial issues. Among others, earthquakes, floods, volcanic activities, tsunamis,
wildfires, or terrorism are active hazards that can damage infrastructure systems and/
or interrupt benefits they deliver. Such failures can range from merely annoying to
decidedly catastrophic, with infrastructure interdependency an undeniable potential
cause of failure in and of itself.
More specifically, the work by Little (2012) for the International Risk Gover-
nance Council (IRGC) is particularly relevant for the case of infrastructure-driven
risk. He analyzes the paradigmatic and iconic cases of the Northeast Power Outage
in 2003, the New Orleans Flood Defense System in 2005, and the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Plant in 2011, under the framework of the IRGC (2010) ‘factors for
risk emergence.’ The main conclusion highlighted by Little, after analyzing the root
causes of three so different events, is that complex infrastructures systems are not
inherently ‘safe’, no matter how well designed they are, residual risk remains. Con-
sequently, for him, a new paradigm is needed to develop and incentivize organiza-
tional culture values and rewards actions to change the dynamics of infrastructure
asset community. So far, such paradigms are providing very elusive solutions as a
whole.
2. Root causes of infrastructure risk governance implementation failures
With the aim of changing the dynamics for the way systemic risks posed by large
civil infrastructure are being managed, we have done an extensive literature review
and informed it with our practical experience by analyzing the underlying issues or
root causes preventing effective implementation of risk governance in the sector. We
have grouped them in four main categories, namely the ontology, the concerns, the
anathemas, and the forgotten, that are next presented.
Metaphorically, these are the obstacles in a race (Figure 1) that lasts forever: risk
governance continuously matures while periodically addressing the essential issues
that are in the basis of its success or failure.
Figure 1. Pictogram of root causes of failure in risk governance.
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2.1. The ontology
As extensively documented by Aven (2010), the fact to be acknowledged is that
there is no agreed definition of risk. As he points out, the concept of risk is mainly
understood either as an expected value, a probability distribution, as uncertainty, or
as an event, while the debate about the real nature of risk is still alive among risk
professionals. Furthermore, Aven (2012a) extends this lack of consensus to the fields
of risk analysis, risk assessment, and risk characterization (i.e. Society of Risk Anal-
ysis [SRA], founded in 1980, has not reached consensus after continued attempts).
In his view, the risk field still suffers from a lack of clarity on many key scientific
pillars beyond the fundamental issue of the risk itself.
Slovic (1987) argued that human beings have invented the concept of risk to
help them understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life. For him,
dangers are real but there is no real or objective risk. Moreover, as a result, he envi-
sions that whoever controls the definition of risk controls the risk management solu-
tion (Slovic and Weber 2002). Some years later, Aven (2012b) stated that ‘the risk
perspective chosen strongly influence the way risk is analyzed and hence it may
have serious implications for the risk management and decision making.’
It is worth mentioning the conflicting views of Rosa (2010) and Aven and Renn
(2010a), with regard to risk as social constructions versus real phenomena as well as
with regard to the role of the magnitude or the probability of harm in the conception
of risk. Rosa (2010) points out that the exclusion of concepts such as severity in
favor of a broader definition enables us to view risks as on a continuum from desir-
able to undesirable. Such an approach supports risk as a way to describe why and
when we take risks and if these risks are commensurate with benefits.
One more factor to consider, as stated by Aven and Renn (2010a), is that sys-
temic risks face a number of specific problems due to the fact that they are often dri-
ven by a crisis and/or actions determined by public opinion. As such, risk
governance frameworks need to consider both facts and sociocultural attributes.
In the day by day reality of many infrastructure owners and organizations, even
before the ontology of risk becomes a real issue, we have faced the impact of what
Funabashi and Kitazawa (2012) named the ‘myth of absolute safety.’ Unfortunately,
the myth that ‘if risk exists, it would equal zero’ preclude meaningful discussions
for many professionals in this field. By practice, we know that residual risk remains
and it is in the understanding of this remaining risk that we make the key, safety-
related decisions.
We understand that organizations must choose their own ontology to start with
and then adjust their language as they learn it more thoroughly through application.
Some might say that a more inclusive ontology also better fits the multiple uses that
practitioners ultimately find for the risk. Conceptualization and perception of risks in
these broader definitions play a fundamental role in governance by permitting risk to
express the full human experience and not the negative dialog some would relegate
it to.
2.2. The concerns: complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity
When analyzing the benefits of linking risk and governance under the umbrella of
risk governance, van Asselt and Renn (2011) identified the goal of providing a con-
ceptual basis to deal with the factors of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity.
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These factors are interrelated as complexity favors uncertainty and both favor ambi-
guity. They identified an urgent need to develop better approaches to understand and
characterize non-simple risks or systemic risks.
Complexity refers (Renn 2008) to the difficulty of identifying and quantifying
causal links between a multiple of potential candidates and specific adverse events.
In the field of critical infrastructure at risk, Kröger (2008) addressed the issue of the
need to extend modeling and simulation techniques in order to cope with the
increasing complexity. At the same time, there is a broad acknowledgment, as
referred by Ezell et al. (2010) that although no single model or methodology can
meet the complexity challenge, multiple approaches, perhaps in combination, may
help.
Wilke (2007), when analyzing smart governance systems in a very broad sense,
points out that coping with uncertainty has been a topic in many disciplines from
philosophy and economics to psychology and cognitive sciences. Furthermore, we
can quote from him that ‘all knowledge is constructed and contingent. It is, figura-
tively speaking, a thin layer of ice over a deep ocean filled with non-knowledge and
contingent knowledge connected to contingent forms of no-knowledge. People walk
on this ice, and some even dance, celebrating their splendid assets of knowledge.’
van Asselt and Vos (2008) have also defined what they call the uncertainty para-
dox, which is an umbrella term for situations in which uncertainty is acknowledged,
but the role of science is framed as one of providing certainty. They further develop
the interesting issue of uncertainty intolerance as one of the pillars of the paradox.
As quoted by van Asselt and Vos (2008) from Forrester and Hanekamp (2006),
under such paradox, a very high level of skepticism as to what science can deliver
goes hand in hand with a very optimistic level of confidence regarding what science
should be able to deliver.
Finally, Renn, Klinke, and van Asselt (2011) find that being complex and uncer-
tain, systemic risks are also a cause of ambiguity, which refers to the existence of
multiple societal values and their impact not only in characterizing risk but in the
tolerability frameworks and decision-making processes. However, others (De Vries,
Verhoeven, and Boeckhout 2011) vigorously argued the utility of the complex-,
uncertain-, and ambiguous-based taxonomies for implementing risk governance
frameworks. For them risk governance could be reformulated around the purpose to
‘organize the efforts needed to translate uncertainty as far as possible into risk’ and
to ensure that this work gets done and who should pay for which part, allocating
specific responsibilities to policy-makers, scientists, citizens, companies, etc.
From what we have experienced in the infrastructure sector, risks are commonly
acknowledged, but uncertainty makes many engineering professionals uncomfortable
and they many times retreat to conventional management systems to make decisions
that mostly ignore risk and uncertainty. This is the uncertainty paradox at play. We
also see that managers of infrastructures also deal with ambiguity, which can be
individual or collective, but it reflects how their value systems influence and how
they judge or bring context to risk-informed decisions. Furthermore, the relevance
of value systems to risk governance comes into play with the use of Tolerable Risk
Guidelines where ambiguity becomes a consideration as owners share responsibility
with many stakeholders, and thus must consider the values they bring to decisions.
One effective way that practitioners in risk governance deal with complexity is to
align the level of detail and analytical effort with the seriousness of the question to
answer. Sometimes, this requires the acceptance of simplifications.
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We would certainly like to find more in practice what Wilke (2007) stated about
uncertainty as an attribute of smart governance systems, which is ‘neither a menace
nor a weakness but should be treated instead as a normal condition of complex deci-
sion-making and governance.’ The task is then, also in his words, to find ‘efficient
ways to cope with uncertainty without destroying uncertainty′s invigorating dynamic.’
In practice, an effective way to deal with complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty
is to consider quantitative risk results as part of a risk informed, not risk-based, deci-
sion framework.
2.3. The anathemas: quantitative analysis and tolerability frameworks
Aven (2010), in his book entitled ‘Misconceptions of Risks,’ highlights the risks of
understanding risk, and more explicitly quantitative risk assessments expressed in a
number of specific ways: as an expected value, a probability or a probability distri-
butions, a probability distribution quantile, an uncertainty, an event, an expected
disutility, an objective probability, a perception, related to negative consequences
only or as objective, among other concerns. Aven (2012b) also cautions against the
use of expected value by itself as risk and remarks stakeholder dissatisfaction with
subjective probabilities.
Authors like Cox (2009) have deeply analyzed the issue of risk quantification.
He brings together many actors that have expressed skepticism, disillusionment, dis-
trust, and dissatisfaction with the quantitative risk analysis (QRA) paradigm while
also referring to the arguments of professional risk analysts who perceive a great
potential practical value. Furthermore, Cox (2009) reflects the fact that, increasingly,
opponents of QRA portray it as part of the problem, rather than as a promising way
to make more effective societal decisions in the presence of risk, uncertainty, and
complexity.
On the other side, Ezell et al. (2010) defend the use of probabilistic risk analysis
against critiques from the National Academies in USA, and even in fields such as
terrorism risk, affirming: ‘it highlights an opportunity for improved clarity and
understanding of uncertainty when a mathematical language for capturing and
expressing degree of belief – probability theory – is used.’
Krause et al. (1998) had explained how qualitative risk can fulfill a need in
conjunction with quantitative estimates. Furthermore, Vlek (2010) supports that risk-
analytic and precautionary-principled approaches, both highly criticized particularly
in the presence of very large uncertainties for different reasons but with surprisingly
parallel arguments, can be converging when both rationale are held against similar
criteria and are developed as integrative and stepwise approaches. He states that the
more an issue is societally important, spatially and temporally extensive, and influ-
enced by uncertainties, the broader the risk assessment and decision procedure
should be.
Aven and Renn (2010b) distinguish that, while acceptability refers to a morally
satisfactory situation, the term tolerability entails that the risk should be further
reduced if possible but not banned. In their view, for both acceptability and tolerabil-
ity limits, society needs ethical criteria to determine the required thresholds. Further-
more, Aven and Renn (2010b) fear that once quantitative tolerability criteria are set,
this need cannot be fulfilled. Abrahamsen and Aven (2012), using expected utility
theory, made the case for the importance of not removing the authorities and not let
the operators dictate the thresholds.
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Finally, a number of authors as Black and Baldwin (2012) have recently
discussed approaches and challenges for risk regulations.
In our experience, no single organization constrains themselves solely to num-
bers, and indeed those explicitly using numbers to inform their decisions have clear
protocols and means to consider what is beyond the numbers to make decisions. We
have observed situations which are not so openly and publicly outspoken when the
issue gets even more anathematic: when quantitative (sometimes referred as
probabilistic) risk analysis is used in combination with risk tolerance or acceptance
criteria.
We have seen that traditional engineering standards and decision frameworks –
such as compliance with design standards – is at its fundamental basis a judgment
as to what is tolerable and acceptable to society. The same can be said for the estab-
lishment of standard deviations on material properties, the factors of safety against
different failures, the frequency schedule for certain maintenance activities, emer-
gency action plans, and many other aspects of infrastructure risk management. Col-
lectively, these measures describe the reasonable actions a responsible owner should
take given a risk. This is nothing less than what the tolerability of risk framework
seeks to accomplish. Such frameworks, whether traditional or with tolerable risk,
balance the need for safety (making systems reliable enough to assure safety) with
the cost and effectiveness of safety actions.
With regard to the role of regulation linked to risk and tolerability frameworks,
we see it as a permanent fear for some, aspiration for others, and very anathematic
for different industries and sectors. On one hand, many claim for a need for clear
regulations and, on the other, many in practice lobby against comprehensive and
meaningful regulations, depending mainly on objective and subjective approaches to
the issue of liability, corporate, or individual.
As a concluding remark, in our view, the discussion on the quantitative, tolera-
bility, and regulatory issues has been unnecessarily polarized by a plethora of lan-
guage misunderstandings and pretentious statements, and the results are too many
times paralyzing the overall process of building risk governance. As a matter of fact,
we envision risk governance practice as the solution to it, as a way to rule out anath-
ematic issues of our conversations and focus on gaining comfortableness with risk
concepts: what it is, how it is defined, and what place risk assessment has, and this
can only be done by doing it.
2.4. The forgotten: people, communication, and decisions
Wilke (2007) alerts about the fact that new models and modes of governance do not
come naturally and they need strategic investments in building capacities and com-
petencies needed for governing complex and knowledge-intensive systems.
van Asselt and Renn (2011) remark that effective mutual communication is one
of the key challenges in risk governance, central to the whole endeavor, at the core
of any successful risk governance activity and with the potential, negatively framed,
to destruct it. In any case, communication is a very broad aspect of governance, as
other suggested risk communications guidelines (Löfstedt 2010) have tried to
embrace.
Concerning this point, Aven and Renn (2010b) have alerted on the need to find a
balance on how much participation is necessary and proportionate to the achievable
objectives, as well as remarked on the interconnected nature of risk communication
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and trust. De Vries, Verhoeven, and Boeckhout (2011) report how, increasingly,
assertive citizens do not believe in consensus reached in closed board meetings. We
can find reported examples (Löfstedt 2010) where a consensual type of regulation,
as well as the relatively high level of public trust in science and government agen-
cies, could explain the willingness of the public to participate in risk governance
(Boholm, Corvellec, and Karlsson 2012).
Furthermore, Boholm, Corvellec, and Karlsson (2012) have shown that institu-
tional dynamics provide insights to understand how specific organizational arrange-
ments shape specific approaches to risk governance. They put the focus on the
rationale of organizational governance, as something that it is embedded in the intri-
cacies of organizational practices, rather than the rationale of risk governance
regimes, which are not necessarily seen as an activity in its own right.
For us, decisions are the most tangible product of governing activities, and deci-
sions require engaged, thinking people. The fundamental role of the organization
personnel (participation, capacity building, etc.), the challenge of communication
(internally and externally to people and communities), and the imperative necessity
of making better decisions are consequently, in our view, the forgotten. Neverthe-
less, we have found that when building risk governance, the focus of public debate
has been very different.
Specifically when dealing with systemic risks, where public safety is a key deci-
sion metric, the market of risk governance is not driven solely or primarily by the
economy, but by the larger community and people which includes the economy. The
recognition of the role society has to play in decisions and the relationship between
risk and these communities is what makes risk governance real and effective.
In summary, people, communication, and decisions are key factors, or indeed the
key factors, in the sense that they are constituent parts of any organization. Further-
more, we have seen that in practice there is no form of risk governance if it is not
embedded in the organizational governance.
3. The journey of the large dams sector toward risk governance
3.1. Introduction
Large dams make a good example of risk governance because they often exhibit
systemic risk within complex systems of civil infrastructures where the uncertainty
is large. More specifically, the sector of ‘dam safety’ encompasses a broad range of
knowledge, industrial applications, professional practices, and investigative activities
that are present in some degree regardless of the scale of the infrastructure system:
from modest infrastructures of urban supply or irrigation to large continental flood
protection systems, river control, and/or energy production systems. Furthermore,
dam safety governance includes all types of geopolitical determinants, since large
dams are present in almost every country.
Halpin and Escuder (2015) have documented the paradoxical fact that, following
the trend of the civil infrastructure sector as a whole, in the dam safety industry,
very few organizations have implemented risk-informed governance, regardless of
how obvious the benefits may seem. As a matter of fact, the vast majority of indus-
try worldwide are ‘non-doers’ in the sense of providing a rational framework for
identifying, analyzing, evaluating, and managing risks.
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In our view, there exist very real and observed root factors that have prevented
dam industry from implementing risk governance in a meaningful way, which are
common for the infrastructure sector (Section 2). Following the path illustrated in
Figure 2, we are next describing the journey of the large dams sector toward risk
governance implementation.
3.2. The journey toward risk governance
First publications relating risk and dam safety are dated more than 30 years ago (i.e.
Baecher, Paté, and De Neufville 1980), though the impact of risk governance para-
digm to dam safety has not been widely published before the second half of the
nineties (e.g. ANCOLD 2003; Bowles, Anderson, and Glover 1998; Hartford and
Baecher 2004; among others). The intensity of the debate can be followed though a
significant number of conferences and workshops worldwide (Escuder-Bueno et al.
2011).
At a first glance, it may seem that industry has a common understanding of risk
in dam safety, and indeed the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD
2005) has tried to balance and reflect such common understanding about the funda-
mentals of risk and its identification, analysis, evaluation, and management. In real-
ity, we can find multiple examples of unclosed discussions on the ontological issue.
Park et al. (2013) when dealing with dam safety do not find sensing, anticipa-
tion, adaptation, and learning as intrinsically linked to the risk governance paradigm.
They have also expressed explicit concerns on how risk analysis deals, in the field
of dam safety, with complexity, uncertainty, and resilience.
Figure 2. Pictogram on the path to succeed in infrastructure risk governance implementa-
tion.
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With regard to the issue of quantitative risk analysis, discussions and arguments
are indeed more diverse. Lund (2008) summarizes the different sensibilities by sus-
taining that probabilistic risk or decision analysis is the most rigorous engineering
approach to difficult decision-making problems involving uncertainty. Lund also
acknowledges that it may be rational not to use probabilistic risk analysis, not to
develop a full probabilistic risk analysis, or not to rely entirely on its results. He also
alerts of the dangers of overselling probabilistic risk analysis.
On the issue of tolerability guidelines linked to quantitative risk outcomes, as
those published and followed by ANCOLD (2003), USBR (2011), or United States
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) (2014a), we can also find diverging point of
views. For instance, Regan (2010) defends that it is impossible to draw a single line
that separates a tolerable level of risk, as for him every dam has unique benefits and
risks. Other authors, e.g. Zielinski (2014), also raise their concerns about the way
tolerability lines may be defined and used.
In summary, both quantitative risk analysis and tolerability guidelines have cer-
tainly become anathemas in the industry, not as much openly discussed as internally
questioned by individuals and organizations.
With regard to the role of people, we certainly do not find relevant references
focused on pointing out how organizations have or have not facilitated steep learn-
ing curves, mutual enrichment in practitioners, or brought innovation. Moreover,
despite the fact that smart risk governance is geared toward making the right
decisions and making these decisions incrementally better, we do not find published
references on practical achievements, confirming their ‘forgotten’ status in the indus-
try. The same applies to risk communication and trust.
As a final example of the current state of the matter, we can mention that the ses-
sion devoted to ‘Advances in Dam Safety, Security, and Risk Management’ (USSD
2013) and the session entitled ‘Towards improving and harmonizing dams
governance in Europe’ (ICOLD, 2013) provided just very few examples of risk
governance frameworks used to make decisions in the industry.
In our view, it can be due to a number of factors potentially driving the problem,
namely:
• The lack of familiarity with the underlying risk concepts, perceived as purely
theoretical, sophisticated, arbitrary and indeed very mathematical by some, and
simply not understood by others.
• The difficulties in dealing with complexity, ambiguity, and particularly with
uncertainty in a very broad sense, from failing to recognize the subjective nat-
ure of the analysis inputs, to the uncertainty of the related decisions.
• The existence of the ‘uncertainty paradox,’ where practitioners recognize
uncertainty exists but see their role as providing certainty in the form of
increasingly more quantitative and complex numerical results.
• The hidden fear to new external regulations in the form of tolerability guideli-
nes, especially when linked to skeptically observed risk numerical outcomes.
• The human resistance to change, as change is uncomfortable, individually and
organizationally, despite the fact that risk governance is primarily for the
reason of more effective decisions
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Despite these factors would need to be analyzed in the future through a scientific
analysis, out of the scope of this paper, professionals currently ‘in the journey’ may
find useful to contrast them with their own experience.
3.3. Two particular journeys: USACE and MAGRAMA
We now present two particular journeys toward risk governance, presenting and
describing the path that has followed to implement risk governance, as well as the
experienced and ongoing difficulties related to the issues of ontology, concerns,
anathemas, and the forgotten.
Part of the interest of putting together both stories relies on the different stages
in their implementation process, as well as the different sizes of both organizations
and overarching legal systems.
It is out of the scope of this paper to evaluate the suitability of the implemented
governance framework by both organizations, and we do not go beyond the facts
relating to what extent the implementation was taken and the experienced
difficulties.
Furthermore, when describing the facts and difficulties, we cannot avoid a
certain degree of subjectivity, as we have experienced them in first person. Still both
stories present elements of potential interest, in our view, for those that may be
currently in similar journeys or considering it.
3.3.1. United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
USACE, the owner and self-regulator of 708 large dams and regulator of over 2500
levee systems in the United States, provides a broad spectrum of risk management,
in which has pioneered the implementation of different risk analysis techniques
(Davis, Faber, and Stedinger 2008), as well as hydropower, water supply, naviga-
tion, and environmental benefits within USA. A major challenge of infrastructure
management in USACE has been the replacement of the experience and institutional
knowledge of its engineers gained during the agency’s major construction era but
now passed for several decades.
Characteristics of the infrastructure under USACE governance have been
described in previous publications by the authors (e.g. Halpin and Escuder 2015).
From a risk perspective, the infrastructure is diverse, spanning over five orders of
magnitude in probability of failure, consequences of failure, and annualized risk.
Approximately one-third of the portfolio is actionable for undesirable risks and the
remaining two-thirds described with tolerable or desirable risks. Historically,
management solely via compliance via a traditional ‘one-size-fits-all’ engineering
standards was viewed as not improving understanding or decisions, nor was it cost
effective. With well over 2000 risk assessments completed, USACE has consider-
able experience evaluating dam and levee infrastructure.
In the last 10 years, USACE has built a bench of practice and expertise in
risk-informed engineering and science via new national technical centers for Risk
Management, Modeling, Mapping, and Consequence Estimation, and Infrastructure
Modification (USACE 2014b). The agency is working strategically with other agen-
cies, industry, and international partners to further build the bench of professionals
to support risk governance – the demand remains greater than the supply. Procedu-
rally, the agency has leveraged this talent to create and implement policies and
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procedures (USACE 2014a; Engineering Regulation ER 1110-2-1156, and FEMA
2015, Federal Guidelines on Dam Safety Risk Management) which complement tra-
ditional engineering standards by infusing risk concepts in decision-making and
communication, including a governance approach which is collaborative, encourages
debate, and deals directly and transparently with uncertainty.
USACE has followed an adaptive learning process to implementing risk gover-
nance which acknowledged a set of skills, policies, and procedures that were not
perfect, but sufficient to begin a journey with. Ten years later, the bench of
professionals has grown to several hundred engineers and scientists, policies and
technologies are state of the art, and risk-informed decisions have reshaped the very
cultural of the agency.
We next describe how USACE navigated through some of the main difficulties
in implementing risk governance:
• The ontological question regarding governance with risk and uncertainty has
evolved significantly from one that was initially a business of calculating small
numbers to a recognition that fundamental understanding and decision-making
are improved through the debate and critical thinking that accompanies risk
assessment. Infrastructure designed and constructed as individual components
can now be evaluated as a system. Comparisons and priorities between sys-
tems are more clear, and cost-effective risk reduction decisions are the norm.
Policies and standards are growing beyond deterministic-only approaches to
one where the incorporation of risk analysis in policies supports making con-
sistent sense of the vast diversity in infrastructure systems and the environ-
ments they inhabit. The language of risk is maturing and spreading from dams
and levees to other business lines in USACE (2015).
• Tolerability of risk concepts for individual and societal loss of life risks was
initially a significant adjustment for USACE, mainly because the prior half
century relied upon a benefit–cost ratio as the primary decision (maybe only)
metric. However, the idea of informing decisions in a collaborative manner
with many perspectives at the table and risk as the common language is
appealing to even the traditionalists that have long been concerned with the
inability to monetize and equilibrate all decision factors.
• If there is an anathema for risk governance in USACE, it is not from the dam
and levee programs where it is employed, but from the competing programs
and decisions that can become a casualty of their own less compelling evi-
dence and justifications. The inequities of confidence and investment between
decisions with and without risk governance in USACE are stark and ultimately
are raising the decision culture across the board (USACE 2015).
• A final challenge, still pending, is that risk and uncertainty must be communi-
cated and socialized if it is to be addressed, and that is often a difficult and
humbling position for the engineers and scientists that designed the infrastruc-
ture. This new understanding of the infrastructure must be effectively commu-
nicated to decision-makers, stakeholders, and particularly the community
downstream the dam, namely because the responsibility to invest and enact
risk reduction is shared now in a larger group, not just the infrastructure
owner.
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As a concluding remark, key to the implementation of risk governance in
USACE was a decision to build new, small national organizations that could help
shape and implement agency’s decision-making and be leveraged to build a broader
bench of competencies through training, and policy and methodology development.
Among them, the Risk Management Center is in our view the core governance
feature that has made the path very difficult to revert.
Benefits of implemented risk governance, as highlighted by an independent
external peer review (USACE 2013), allows USACE to explore a vastly uncertain
environment in a rationale, transparent, and confident manner, whereas the tradi-
tional approach borrowed a false confidence based on unrealistically certain stan-
dards and numbers which never accomplished the ‘one-size-fits-all’ objective. Risk
governance has not only been achievable and economically, socially, and environ-
mentally worthwhile in the USACE infrastructure management, it is considered the
best lens with which engineers and scientists have to explain the benefits and risks
of infrastructure to society. To date, over seven billion dollars has been saved or cost
avoided through the implementation of risk-informed governance (USACE 2014b).
3.3.2. Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment (MAGRAMA)
Spain ranks first among the European Union countries and fourth in the world
according to number of large dams, resulting in a water regulatory capacity which is
today approaching 50% of all renewable water resources. Most Spanish dams, 72%,
(64% gravity, 5% arch dams, 3% buttress) are concrete or masonry, as opposed to
28% which are embankment dams (17% earth, 11% rockfill). Such population of
dams, providing the reservoir water volume which is of critical value for the exis-
tence itself of the country, is in the average growing old as today 25% of the dams
are over 50 years old, and 60% over 30 years old.
Around one-third of the total Spanish large dams are owned and operated by
MAGRAMA through the surrogated authorities given to the River Basin Authorities
(RBAs) which, in addition, hold the authority to enforce and develop integrated
water resources planning and management, flood control and environmental protec-
tion, among other activities. Characteristics of the dams themselves and of other
infrastructure under MAGRAMA governance through the State Office of Water
(DGA) and RBAs have been described previously by the authors (Halpin and
Escuder 2015).
Overarching European Directives such us Directive on Floods (EC 2007) and
Directive on Critical Infrastructures (EC 2008) and specific Dam Safety pieces of
legislation explicitly encourage to an effective identification, analysis, evaluation,
and management of risk. However, the current implementation of risk governance
systems to dam safety has been limited in space and time framework (e.g. Pilot Case
of Duero RBA from 2008 to 2011, as described by Ardiles et al. 2011).
However, if MAGRAMA had not carried Pilot Case of Duero River Basin, in all
probability, there would be no SPANCOLD (2012) Technical Guide on Risk analy-
sis applied to management of dam safety. It today serves as a reference guide toward
risk governance for many operators in Spain and other countries (Moralo García
et al. 2015; Setrakian et al. 2015) and it is the key manual for capacity building in
the matter in Spain.
We next describe how MAGRAMA navigated through some of the main
difficulties in implementing risk governance:
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• The ontological question regarding the safety of dams remains an open one
among Spanish experts in dam safety and Duero RBA works focused the
debate without closing it.
• Testimony collected ranging from that of confirms extensive preoccupation
with the treatment of the uncertainty as well as the complexity of the opera-
tions of dam systems, being important that Duero RBA works started with
some very detailed case studies to develop a minimum but reasonable consen-
sus on the procedures, simplifications, etc.
• The appropriateness of even carrying out quantitative analyses also lacks a
clear consensus, and the fact that such analyses may be linked to tolerability
recommendations creates misgivings in and out of the public sector. The deci-
sion was to adopt a set of standards from ANCOLD (2003) and USBR (2011),
and postpone the important but not critical issue of adopting MAGRAMA
tailored ones.
• The role of people, with more than 120 personnel involved in the Duero RBA
works, transparency in communication, with multiple public meetings and pub-
lications issues, and the importance of the decisions taken, from decommis-
sioning one of the dams to complete re-scheduling of the investment priorities,
were widely recognized.
Finally, in our view, the Duero RBA experience can be considered as an ignition
point, as this experience is going to be extended and improved to Ebro and Tajo
RBAs, two of the most important and extensive of the country. Furthermore, impor-
tant public and private owners and operators of dams, such as the regional govern-
ment of Extremadura or the water supply company to the metropolitan area of
Madrid, are implementing risk governance programs while building personnel and
new corporate capabilities.
4. Summary and final remarks
In this article, we have reviewed many of the valuable contributions, conceptual and
theoretical, which today refer to as smart governance in one of its most relevant cur-
rent applications, governance of risk.
We have addressed these contributions in a way that allows us to understand the
overall issue, and subsequently to analyze at the infrastructure sector level, the root
causes of failure in implementation of risk governance in practice. Namely, the
ontology, concerns, anathemas, and the forgotten issues, in our view, explain a great
part of it.
We have then analyzed the vast sector of large dams and their safety, under this
newly formulated view and presented two successful examples with differing scales
and geopolitical determinants. One of the most impactful conclusions regarding dam
safety involves the contrast between the amount of activity and energy devoted to
theoretical questions and the scarcity of apportionments for implementation.
The debates over ontological questions, management of uncertainty, the impact
of complexity and ambiguity, the validity of quantification, or the legitimacy of tol-
erability criteria not only should never be discounted prematurely, but should con-
tinue. Debate – intense, legitimate, and well-intentioned – should be a fundamental
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value in our advancement and should never be a reason for our not being in the
vanguard of what society expects from all of us who strive to serve it.
Based on our experience in all areas of risk governance of dam safety, and in the
analysis on the root causes of the relatively low degree of risk governance imple-
mentation in the sector, we believe that the smarter way to advance and serve the
goal of building safer societies involves a delicate but necessary balance between
theory and practice, between pragmatism and robustness, between proactivity and
prudence, between teaching and learning, between dynamism and consolidation of
best practices.
We would like to end the paper quoting the philosopher Amin Maalouf (2011):
the relevant question is not whether our attitudes and behavior have progressed in com-
parison to those of our ancestors; it is whether they have changed enough to face the
enormous challenges of the contemporary world.
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